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Abstract
By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of con-
ditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change
the eﬀects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual
cost parameters gives the following trade-oﬀ in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases
the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the
other hand, information sharing increases the ﬁrms’ incentives to acquire information, and the
consumer surplus increases in the precision of the ﬁrms’ information. Interestingly, the latter
eﬀect may dominate the former eﬀect.
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The role of trade associations in facilitating ﬁrms sharing information, has always been an
important and controversial topic for economic theorists, practitioners and antitrust authorities.
On the practical side, the controversy starts with some contradictory decisions taken by US Courts
(e.g., see Vives (1990) for details). Currently, although antitrust authorities do not forbid explicitly
the exchange of information (as long as it is not used to facilitate collusion or deter entry),
suspicions remain.1 On the theoretical side, there is a classical literature (see, e.g., K¨ uhn and
Vives (1995), Raith (1996), and Vives (1999) for surveys) that provides a taxonomy of regulatory
recommendations depending on the type of strategic interaction, and the type of information.
This paper tries to look at this old issue with new methodological techniques and taking the
new perspective of information economics, which allows agents to some extent to determine their
information structures. In particular, we focus on a simple question that has a clear answer
in the previous literature: Should Cournot oligopolists be allowed to share information about
their private costs of production? The answer of the classical literature on information sharing
in oligopoly seems to be unambiguously negative. In the ﬁrst place, information sharing among
competing ﬁrms decreases the consumer surplus when the ﬁrms compete in quantities (Shapiro,
1986, Sakai and Yamato, 1989). Moreover, information sharing may facilitate collusion between
ﬁrms, which also hurts consumers.2 Hence, a policy maker, who maximizes expected consumer
surplus, should prohibit agreements among Cournot oligopolists to share information about their
costs. However, we do not observe many regulatory restrictions on information sharing in reality.3
However, this conclusion was drawn in settings where ﬁrms receive information exogenously.
In this paper we show that the policy conclusion may become ambiguous when information is
endogenous, i.e., ﬁrms invest in acquiring information.4 This may provide a rationale for the
1See K¨ uhn and Vives (1995), Vives (1990), and K¨ uhn (2001) for a discussion on the decisions of antitrust
authorities regarding information-sharing policies.
2Information sharing may help ﬁrms to detect deviations from collusive agreements (Green and Porter (1984)).
3We claim that this result should lead to regulatory constraints not only because there are economic sectors
as automobile industry that are typically associated with Cournot competition. But also, since with Bertrand
c o m p e t i t i o ni tc a nb es h o w nt h a tc o m p e t i n gﬁrms do not have an interest in sharing information.
4There can be several situations where a ﬁrm may not have complete information about its cost of production.
For example, the production process of the car industry is complex, and the decisions about how much to produce
is taken before some of the production contracts are signed and some input costs are known. In other words, the
production decisions are based on expected cost. Further, a ﬁrm may have developed a process innovation, and it
may not be clear how far this innovation reduces the ﬁrm’s cost. In addition, there may be incomplete information
1observed lenient antitrust policy regarding information sharing. This counter-intuitive result is
based on the fact that allowing ﬁrms to share information has two eﬀects on consumer surplus.
On the one hand, as previous literature pointed out, there is a negative direct eﬀect. For an
exogenously given level of information precision, allowing information sharing between ﬁrms has
a negative eﬀect (positive eﬀect) on the consumer surplus (proﬁts of the ﬁrms). However, on the
other hand, there is a positive indirect eﬀect of sharing information. This is due to the fact that
the incentives of acquiring information are larger when ﬁrms are allowed to share information. The
higher investments by ﬁrms that share information have a positive eﬀect on the consumer surplus.
On top of that, we provide an example in which allowing ﬁrms to share information increases the
consumer surplus, i.e., the positive indirect eﬀect dominates the negative direct eﬀect.
One of the main diﬃculties in translating the theoretical results of information sharing to
regulatory policies is that it is diﬃcult to obtain unambiguous results. We have to acknowledge
that, although making information structures endogenous is a necessary step in understanding
the welfare consequences of information-sharing policies, it may make this task more complex.
However, the second main contribution of this paper is to clarify the driving forces of our and
existing results. Basically, we show that most of the results are due to the fact that the objective
functions of the ﬁrms (i.e., proﬁts) and antitrust authority (i.e., consumer surplus) are convex
functions of the ﬁrms’ outputs. This implies that the dispersion of the ﬁrms’ outputs has a clear
impact on the outcomes. In turn, information sharing and information acquisition strategies
determine the quality of information held by ﬁrms (i.e., the distribution of posterior beliefs), and
indirectly, the dispersion of outputs.
Recently, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) has provided a family of precision criteria for ranking
information structures according to the eﬀect that information has on the dispersion of conditional
expectations. The basic principle of these precision criteria is that a more accurate information
structure leads to a more disperse distribution of the conditional expectation. Applying these
informativeness measures allows us to obtain very general results in terms of the information
structures under consideration.
Besides this conceptual contribution, we attempt to contribute to the literature on information
acquisition in oligopoly. Li et al. (1987), Hwang (1995), Hauk and Hurkens (2001) study the
about geological or meteorological conditions for ﬁrms that extract natural resources.
2information acquisition incentives of Cournot oligopolists. These papers assume that ﬁrms do
not share their acquired information, and make complementary comparisons.5 By contrast, we
focus on the interaction between the incentives to acquire information and to share information.
Fried (1984), Kirby (2004), and Jansen (2008) study the eﬀects of this interaction on the expected
proﬁts of ﬁrms. In contrast to these papers, we focus on welfare eﬀects, and we consider more
general information structures.
Persico (2000) studies the interaction between information acquisition and information aggre-
g a t i o ni na na u c t i o nm o d e lw i t ha ﬃliated values. For a given information structure the second
price auction yields a higher expected revenue to an auctioneer than the ﬁr s tp r i c ea u c t i o n .B u tt h e
ﬁrst price auction gives a greater incentive to acquire information, which may reverse the expected
revenue ranking. As in our paper, Persico (2000) also considers general information structures
but ordered according to an alternative informativeness criterion (i.e., Lehmann (1986)).
In the next section we describe the model. Section 3 deﬁnes the concept of Integral Precision
for signals. Section 4 brieﬂy describes the equilibrium strategies. Section 5 compares expected
consumer surplus levels in equilibrium. Section 6 extends the analysis in some relevant direc-
tions. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The
Supplementary Appendix presents some results related to the model’s extensions.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Preferences and Technology
Consider an industry where two risk-neutral ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms 1 and 2) compete in quantities
of diﬀerentiated goods.6 The representative consumer’s gross surplus from consuming (x1,x 2)i s :
u(x1,x 2) ≡ α(x1 + x2) −
1
2
(x1 + x2)2 +( 1− β)x1x2, (1)
with 0 <β≤ 1. Hence, the inverse demand function for good i is linear in the outputs, i.e.,
Pi(xi,x j)=α−xi−βxj. The demand intercept α is suﬃciently high. The parameter β represents
5For example, Hwang (1995) observes that information acquisition incentives are important for the welfare com-
parison between perfect competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. Although perfect competition yields the highest
expected welfare for any exogenously given precision of information, it may fail to do so when the precision is deter-
mined endogenously, since ﬁrms in perfectly competitive markets may have a lower incentive to acquire information.
Whereas Hwang changes the mode of competition while keeping information sharing constant, we do the opposite.
6Section 6 considers an oligopoly with N ﬁrms (N ≥ 2). All duopoly results also hold with more than two ﬁrms.
3the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2. For β = 1 the goods are perfect substitutes,
while for β = 0 the markets for the goods are independent. The consumption of the bundle
(x1,x 2) gives the representative consumer a net surplus of:






(x1 + x2)2 − (1 − β)x1x2. (2)
Firms have constant marginal costs of production. Firm i’s proﬁt of producing quantity xi at
marginal cost θi is simply: πi(xi,x j;θi)=[ Pi(xi,x j) − θi]xi for i,j =1 ,2a n dj 6= i.
2.2 Firms’ Information Structures




→ [0,1] with mean θi.F i r m i can acquire a costly signal Sδ
i about θi,w h e r e
Sδ
i ∈ S for some set S.S i g n a lSδ
i is characterized by the family of distributions {Hδ(s|θi)}θi.T h a t
is, given the marginal cost θi, which is a realization of the random variable Θi, Sδ
i is represented
by the conditional distribution Hδ(s|θi)=P r ( Sδ
i ≤ s|Θi = θi). The prior distribution Fi(θ)a n d
the signal distribution {Hδ(s|θi)}θi deﬁne the information structure, i.e., the joint distribution of
(Θi,Sδ
i ). Parameter δ orders the signals in the sense of Integral Precision (see section 3). We
denote the cost of acquiring a signal Sδ
i of precision δ by c(δ), where c is increasing in δ.
We assume that Hδ(s|θi) admits a density hδ(s|θi). The marginal distribution of Sδ
i is denoted
by Hδ











i] denote the posterior distributions and the conditional expectation of
Θi conditional on Sδ
i = sδ
i
2.3 Firms’ Information Sharing Policies
If the antitrust authority allows information sharing between ﬁrms, the ﬁrms simultaneously
choose their information-sharing policy vis-` a-vis their competitor before they acquire the signal.7
7In other words, ﬁrms unilaterally choose whether to precommit to information sharing. Alternative assumptions
could be to allow the ﬁrms to precommit cooperatively to share information (through a quid pro quo agreement), or
to assume that ﬁrms make strategic information sharing choices (i.e., each ﬁrm chooses whether to share information
after it learns its signal). As it turns out, in equilibrium the information sharing choices are not aﬀected by these
changes of assumptions (e.g., see Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) on strategic information disclosure).
4As is common in the literature (e.g., Raith (1996)), a ﬁrm either shares its information truthfully
or it keeps the information secret. We focus on a parametric family of information-sharing policies.
Firm i chooses ρi ∈ [0,1], which implies that ﬁrm j receives the informative message, mi = sδ
i
(the private realization of the signal Sδ
i ), with probability ρi, and the non-informative message,
mi = ∅, with the complementary probability, 1 − ρi.
2.4 Timing
1. Initially, an antitrust authority chooses whether to allow or prohibit information sharing
between the ﬁrms in the industry. The authority maximizes the expected consumer surplus.
2. In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously choose their information-sharing policy vis-` a-vis
their competitor, ρi ∈ [0,1], taking into account the decision of the antitrust authority.
3. The marginal costs of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are determined by two independent draws from their
corresponding distributions F1 and F2, respectively.
4. Firms simultaneously choose information acquisition investments: δi at a cost of c(δi), with
c increasing in δi for i =1 ,2. Firm i’s investment δi determines the precision of the ﬁrm’s
cost signal Sδ
i .S i g n a lSδ
i is characterized by the family of distributions {Hδ(s|θi)}θi.
5. Firms send messages about their signal in accordance with their information-sharing policies
in stage 2. If ﬁrm i precommitted to share its information in accordance with ρi,t h e nﬁrm
j will receive an informative message mi = sδ
i (the private realization of the signal Sδ
i )w i t h
probability ρi and an uninformative message mi = ∅, with probability 1 − ρi.
6. In the ﬁnal stage ﬁrms simultaneously choose their output levels, xi ≥ 0f o rﬁrm i,t o
maximize the expected value of πi(xi,x j;θi), i.e., ﬁrms are Cournot competitors.
We solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to perfect Bayesian equilibria. Before
solving the model, we want to discuss how the choice of information acquisition investment δi
determines the information structure.
53 Information Criteria: Integral Precision
In this paper we assume that the parameter δi rank signals according to Integral Precision.
Precision criteria (introduced by Ganuza and Penalva, 2010) are based on the principle that an
information structure, i.e., the joint distribution of the state of the world and the signal, is more
informative (more precise) than another if it generates more dispersed conditional expectations.
This dispersion eﬀect arises because the sensitivity of conditional expectations to the realized value
of the signal depends on the informational content of the signal. If the informational content of
the signal is low, conditional expectations are concentrated around the expected value of the prior.
When the informational content is high, conditional expectations depend to a large extent on the
realization of the signal which increases their variability.
In our context, given the prior distribution Fi(θ), we assume that if δi >δ 0
i then Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]i s
“more spread out” than Ei[θ|Sδ0
i ]. In the present paper, we use the Integral Precision criterion,
which combines this approach with the convex order (Ganuza and Penalva, 2010):
Deﬁnition 1 (Convex Order) Let Y and Z be two real-valued random variables with distrib-
ution F and G respectively. Then Y is greater than Z in the convex order (Y ≥cx Z) if for all
convex real-valued functions φ, E[φ(Y )] ≥ E[φ(Z)] provided the expectation exists.
Using the convex order, Ganuza and Penalva deﬁne Integral Precision to order signals in terms
of their informativeness:
Deﬁnition 2 (Integral Precision) Given a prior Fi(θ) and two signals S1 and S2,s i g n a lS1 is
more integral precise than S2 if Ei[θ|S1] is greater than Ei[θ|S2] in the convex order.
Ganuza and Penalva (2010) show that Integral Precision is weaker than (is implied by) all
common informativeness orders based on the value of information for a decision maker (Blackwell,
1951, Lehmann, 1988, and Athey and Levin, 2001). In other words, if S1 is more valuable for
a decision maker than S2,t h e nS1 is more integral precise than S2. The following information
models are consistent with Integral Precision.
Normal Experiments: Let Fi(θ) ∼ N(μ,σ2
v)a n dSδ
i = θi +  δ,w h e r e δ ∼ N(0,σ2
δ)a n di s
independent of θi. The variance of the noise, σ2
δ, orders signals in the usual way: we assume that
6δ>δ 0 ⇐⇒ σ2
δ <σ 2
δ0 and the signal with a noise term that has lower variance is more informative
in terms of Integral Precision.
Linear Experiments: Let the signal be perfectly informative, Sδ
i = θi, with probability δ,
and the signal is pure noise, Sδ
i =   where   ∼ Fi(θ) and is independent of θi, with probability
1 − δ.L e t Sδ
i and Sδ0
i be two such signals. If δ>δ 0,i . e . Sδ
i reveals the truth with a higher
probability than Sδ0
i ,t h e nSδ
i is more informative than Sδ0
i in terms of Integral Precision.
Binary Experiments: Let θi be equal to θh with probability q and θl with probability 1−q.
The signal, Sδ
i , can take two values h or l,w h e r eP r [ Sδ
i = k|θi = θk]=1
2(1+δi)f o ri ∈ {1,2} and
k ∈ {l,h},w h e r e0≤ δi ≤ 1. The parameter δi orders signals in the usual way: higher δ implies
greater Integral Precision.




2δ,θ i + 1
2δ
¤
. For any δ,δ0 with δ>δ 0, Sδ
i is more informative than Sδ0
i in terms
of Integral Precision.
Partitions: Let Fi(θ) have support equal to [0,1]. Consider two signals generated by two
partitions of [0,1], A and B,w h e r eB is ﬁner than A.8 Using these partitions, one can deﬁne
signals Sδ
i and Sδ0
i in the usual way: signal Sδ
i [Sδ0
i ] tells you which set in the partition A [B]
contains θi.9 If a larger δ means a ﬁner partition, δ orders signals according to Integral Precision.
4 Solving the Model: Equilibrium Strategies
First, we characterize the equilibrium output levels. Second, we analyze the information
acquisition choices of ﬁrms. Finally, we analyze the information-sharing choices of the ﬁrms.
4.1 Output Levels
Each ﬁrm chooses its output level on the basis of its own information, si, and the information
received from its competitor, mj ∈ {sj,∅}. In order to save notation we do not make explicit
the dependence of si on δi. The expected cost given the uninformative message mj = ∅ is:
8A partition, A,d i v i d e s[ 0 ,1] into disjoint subsets, A = {A1,..,A k}, i.e., ∪
k
j=1Aj =[ 0 ,1] and Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for all
i,j =1 ,..,kwith i 6= j.P a r t i t i o nB is ﬁner than A,w h e nf o ra l lB ∈ B,t h e r ee x i s t sA ∈ A such that B ⊆ A.
9However, observing Aj [Bj] does not allow you to distinguish between diﬀerent states of the world within that
set.
7E{θj|∅} = θj.
For any combination of messages mi and mj, ﬁrm i with signal si maximizes its expected





α − E{θi|si} − βE{xj(sj)|mj}
¶
(3)
for i,j =1 ,2w i t hi 6= j. Solving the system of equations (3) for i =1 ,2 gives the following












where E{θi|mi} = Esi{E(θi|si)|mi}. First, notice that the last term is the distortion due to the
asymmetric information between ﬁrms. If mi = si, there is no distortion. If mi = ∅ and si gives
bad news (high θi), the term is positive since the ﬁrm j is reacting to the average cost, producing
less than it would have produced with perfect information. Conversely, concealed good news gives
a negative distortion. Second, notice that the expected equilibrium output level is independent






























and Esj,mj[.]i sd e ﬁned likewise. Hence, information acquisition and sharing have no eﬀect on the
average output level. They only have an eﬀect on the output dispersion.
The expected equilibrium product market proﬁts of ﬁrm i with signal si, and messages mi
and mj equals: π∗
i(si;mi,m j)=x∗
i(si;mi,m j)2. Hence, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁte q u a l s :





− c(δi)( 6 )
Notice that the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is convex in its own output. This feature of the objective
function is important for our future results. It implies that ﬁrms prefer more dispersed individual
outputs. As we show below, the information sharingp o l i c i e sa sw e l la st h ei n f o r m a t i o na c q u i s i t i o n
strategies aﬀect the dispersion of the outputs.
84.2 Information Acquisition
In this subsection, we study the eﬀects of information acquisition investments on ﬁrms. First,
we analyze the eﬀects of information acquisition investments on the expected proﬁt.






increasing in the own information acquisition investment δi, and (ii) weakly increasing in the
competitor’s investment δj.
Proposition 1(i) conﬁrms that a ﬁrm generates a positive revenue by acquiring information.






against the marginal cost of investment c0(δi). In Proposition 1(ii) we show that also the infor-
mation acquisition investment of the competitor increases a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt.
Second, we analyze the relationship between the information acquisition incentives and the
information sharing policy.
Lemma 1 The expected proﬁt Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) is supermodular in (δi,ρ i).
In other words, for ρi >ρ 0
i, the proﬁtd i ﬀerence Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) − Πi(δi,δ j;ρ0
i,ρ j)i sw e a k l y
increasing in δi for all δj and ρj. This implies that information-sharing ﬁrms have a greater
incentive to acquire information than concealing ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 Firm i’s equilibrium information acquisition investment, δ∗
i , is: (i) independent
of the competitor’s information sharing choice, ρj, and (ii) increasing in the own choice, ρi.
Proposition 2(i) is due to the independence of the ﬁrms’ costs and signals. The next section
analyzes incentives of ﬁrms to share information, and gives intuition for Propositions 1 and 2(ii).
4.3 Information Sharing
For a given precision, information sharing is a dominant strategy for a ﬁrm (Gal-Or (1986),
Shapiro (1986)). We conﬁrm that sharing information is also a dominant strategy in our model.
Proposition 3 The expected proﬁt Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) is increasing in ρi and ρj for all (δi,δ j).
9We cannot directly apply this result since in our model the precision is not exogenously given,
but it depends on the information-sharing choices of the ﬁrms. The eﬀect of information sharing





























The ﬁrst term of (7) is zero, since the ﬁrm chooses its information acquisition investment optimally
(i.e., ∂Πi/∂δi = 0). Also the second term of (7) is zero. This follows from Proposition 2(i), which
shows that the competitor’s equilibrium information acquisition investment is independent of the
ﬁrm’s information sharing choice (i.e., ∂δ∗
j/∂ρi = 0). Finally, Proposition 3 shows that the last
term of (7) is positive. Hence, information sharing is also a dominant strategy in our model.
The propositions have another implication. We can decompose the eﬀects of information





























As before, Proposition 2(i) implies that the ﬁrst term of (8) is zero (i.e., ∂δ∗
i /∂ρj =0 ) . T h e
second term of (8) captures an indirect eﬀect of information sharing. This eﬀect is non-negative
for the following reasons. First, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is weakly increasing in the competitor’s information
acquisition investment (i.e., ∂Πi/∂δj ≥ 0), as Proposition 1(ii) shows. Second, Proposition 2(ii)
shows that the competitor’s investment is increasing in a ﬁrm’s information-sharing probability
(i.e., ∂δ∗
j/∂ρj > 0). Finally, the third term of (8) is positive due to Proposition 3. Hence, the
overall eﬀect of information sharing on a competitor’s expected proﬁt is positive. This observation
implies that ﬁrms would also have an incentive to share information cooperatively (e.g., by entering
a quid pro quo agreement), since information sharing increases the industry proﬁts.
In short, ﬁrms will share information if they are allowed to do so.10 In the remainder of this
section we illustrate the intuition of Propositions 1-3 by means of a simple example.
10This result may also hold in a model in which the ﬁrms would make strategic information-sharing decisions (i.e.,
they choose whether to share or conceal after receiving their private signal), and the ﬁrms’ signals are informative,
see Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990).
104.4 Binary Example
Consider a simple version of our model in which two risk-neutral ﬁrms compete in quantities
of a homogenous goods (β = 1). There is uncertainty only regarding ﬁrm 1’s cost. Nature draws
θ1 from the set {θl,θh} with equal probability and sends a private signal to ﬁrm 1:
Sδ =
½
θ1 with probability δ1
∅ with probability 1 − δ1.
Firm 2’s cost θ2 is common knowledge. Information sharing policies and information acquisition
strategies are binary, i.e. δ1,ρ 1 ∈ {0,1}.
Illustration of the ProﬁtR e s u l t s . In our binary example, we have to consider three regimes.
First, there is the information sharing regime (s), in which ﬁrm 1 learns perfectly its cost and
shares this information with its competitor (i.e., δ1 =1 ,ρ1 = 1). This allows both ﬁrms to adjust
their outputs to the true productivity of ﬁrm 1. Fig. 1(a) illustrates this. In particular, if the
ﬁrms learn that θ1 = θh,t h e nﬁr m1 ’ sb e s tr e s p o n s ei sr1(x2;θh). Firm 2’s best response is the
bold curve r2(x1;θ2). The equilibrium corresponds to point A. Similarly, if the ﬁrms learn that
θ1 = θl,t h e nﬁrm 1 expands its output by adopting best response r1(x2;θl)w h i l eﬁrm 2 reduces




1(θh)f o rﬁrm 1, and dispersion ∆xs
2 ≡ xs
2(θh) − xs
2(θl)f o rﬁrm 2.
r2(x1;θ2)






















Fig. 1(a): regime (s)
r2(x1;θ2)
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Fig. 1(b): regime (o)
r2(x1;θ2)
H H H H H H H
H H H H H H H












Fig. 1(c): regime (n)
Figure 1: Equilibrium output levels
Second, in the information concealment regime (o) ﬁrm 1 learns perfectly its cost and keeps this
information secret from its competitor (i.e., δ1 =1 ,ρ1 = 0). Then, ﬁrm 1 adjusts its output level
11to its productivity while ﬁrm 2 can only base its output decision on the average productivity of 1.
That is, ﬁrm 2 plays a best response against the expected best response of ﬁrm 1, E{r1(x2;θ1)}.
This gives equilibrium output xo
2 for ﬁrm 2, which corresponds to point E in Fig. 1(b). In turn,
ﬁrm 1 plays a best response against xo
2,w h i c hi sxo
1(θh)i fθ1 = θh (corresponding to point C), and
xo
1(θl)i fθ1 = θl (i.e., point D). Fig. 1(b) shows that the dispersion of ﬁrm 1’s output in regime




1. The greater dispersion in
regime (s) is due to the fact that the output adjustments of ﬁrm 2 augment the adjustments of
ﬁrm 1 towards its information. The distortion of equilibrium output (4) also captures this.
Finally, in the no information regime (n) ﬁrm 1 does not learn its cost and there is not
information to transmit (δ1 = 0). Uninformed ﬁrms base their output choices on the average
technology of ﬁrm 1. This gives ﬁrm 1 the best response r1(x2;E{θ1}), and yields the equilibrium
in point E in Fig. 1(c). In this case, there is a single output level for ﬁrm 1 (i.e., ∆xn
1 =0 ) .
The proﬁt function of a ﬁrm (6) is convex in the ﬁrm’s output level. Hence, ﬁrms 1 and
2 prefer regime (s) to regime (o) since the dispersions of their outputs are larger in the former




2. For the same token, Propositions
1 and 2(ii) are captured in this example, by comparing the increase in ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from the
no information regime to either the regime (s) or regime (o). These increases in proﬁts are also
related to the increase in output dispersion. Clearly, information acquisition gives more dispersed




2 for r ∈ {s,o}.
Moreover, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt increases more (and consequently the ﬁrm has a bigger incentive to invest
in acquiring information) when it moves from regime (n) to regime (s) than when it moves from




1, as Proposition 2(ii) shows in general.
5 Expected Consumer Surplus
Using the deﬁnition of the surplus v in (2) for a bundle of outputs (x1,x 2), we denote the
expected consumer surplus for exogenously given information acquisition levels as follows:


























12Below we analyze the eﬀects of information sharing and acquisition on this expected surplus.
5.1 Consumer Surplus Properties
The next proposition establishes a basic property of the consumer surplus in our framework.
Proposition 4 Surplus V (δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) is decreasing in ρk and increasing in δk for any k ∈ {i,j}.
These surplus results are consequences of the quantity adjustment eﬀect, and the preference
for variety eﬀect (e.g., K¨ uhn and Vives (1995)). Below we explain and illustrate the results in
greater detail by means of the binary example.
Illustration of the Surplus Results. We return to the binary example of section 4.4. Figure
2 illustrates the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 by comparing the surpluses in regimes (s) and (o).
r2(x1;θ2)
H H H H H H H H
H H H H H H H H













































































Fig. 2(b): Eﬀects on consumer surplus
Figure 2: Consumer surplus and information sharing
In our example, where goods are homogenous, only the ﬁrst term of (9) matters. As a conse-
quence, the consumer surplus is simply increasing in the dispersion of the total industry output
since it is a convex function of x∗
1 + x∗
2. Figure 2(a) illustrates that the dispersion in industry
output is lower in regime (s) than in regime (o), since ∆Xs = ∆xs
1 − ∆xs
2 < ∆xo
1 = ∆Xo.I n
words, output adjustment by ﬁrm 2 in the information-sharing regime, countervails ﬁrm 1’s ad-
justment, which creates lower variability of industry outputs than in the concealing regime. Fig.
2(b) illustrates how a lower dispersion of output in the regime (s) leads to a lower consumer
surplus than in regime (o). The areas L and G represent respectively the loss (when θ1 = θl)a n d
13the gain (when θ1 = θh) between regime (s) and (o), and it is clear that area L is larger than area
G. Hence, on average consumers are worse oﬀ in regime (s).
The illustration of the second part of the proposition is direct in our example, given the
convexity of the consumer surplus function. There is no dispersion of output in the no information
regime (n). Hence, the consumer surplus is lower than in either regime (s) or (o). These eﬀects,
related to the ﬁrst term of (9), capture the quantity adjustment eﬀect (K¨ uhn and Vives (1995)).
Notice that the second term of (9) is related to covariance of the ﬁrms’ output levels and
conﬂicts with the eﬀects illustrated in the example and the statement of Proposition 4. Sharing
information and acquiring information both reduce the covariance of ﬁrms output which increases
consumer surplus. This is called the preference for variety eﬀect (K¨ uhn and Vives (1995)). The
proof of Proposition 4 shows that the quantity adjustment eﬀect due to the ﬁrst term of (9)
dominates this second eﬀect.
5.2 Consumer Surplus Trade-oﬀ





























This decomposition yields an interesting trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, information sharing has a
negative direct eﬀect on the consumer surplus, as we show in Proposition 4. The last term of
(10) captures this eﬀect (i.e., ∂V/∂ρi < 0). Therefore, if the precision were exogenously given,
then information sharing should be prohibited. On the other hand, information sharing has a
positive indirect eﬀect on the consumer surplus. It increases the incentives to invest in information
acquisition (i.e., ∂δ∗
i/∂ρi > 0 as Proposition 2(ii) shows). Higher investments increase the expected
consumer surplus (i.e., ∂V/∂δi > 0 by Proposition 4). The ﬁrst term of (10) captures this positive,
indirect eﬀect. The second term of (10) is zero, since ∂δ∗
j/∂ρi = 0 by Proposition 2(i).
Hence, when the signal’s precision is not exogenous, but determined endogenously by informa-
tion acquisition investments, the antitrust authority’s choice (between allowing and disallowing
information sharing) should depend on the trade-oﬀ between these two conﬂicting eﬀects. In fact,
it is possible that the second eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst eﬀect, as we illustrate below.
14Illustration of the Trade-oﬀ: Information Sharing May Increase Consumer Surplus.
In the example of section 4.4, the expected consumer surpluses under information sharing (ρ1 =1 )

































We illustrate these surpluses by means of Figure 3. The ﬁgure illustrates that information sharing
decreases the surplus (i.e., V (δ1;1)≤ V (δ1;0) for any δ1), and information acquisition increases










Figure 3: Trade-oﬀ for consumers
Figure 3 suggests that the indirect eﬀect of information sharing may be the dominant eﬀect.
The next proposition gives a condition such that our example delivers this result.
Proposition 5 Consider the binary example of section 4.4 with the cost of acquiring information







Whereas the direct eﬀect of information sharing generates a lower surplus for given investments
in information acquisition than concealment (i.e., V (δ1;1) ≤ V (δ1;0) as illustrated for δ1 =1 ) ,
the indirect eﬀect favors information sharing. When λ satisﬁes the condition of Proposition 5,
ﬁrm 1 acquires information only if it is allowed to share information, i.e., δ∗
1(1) = 1 > 0=δ∗
1(0).
This favors information sharing, since the more information ﬁrm 1 acquires, the larger the surplus
(i.e., V (1;1) >V(0;1)). The indirect eﬀect dominates, since V (1;1) >V(0;1) = V (0;0).
By contrast, if λ is lower than
(θh−θl)2
16 , ﬁrm 1 always acquires information, and then the direct
eﬀect implies that V (1;1) <V(1;0). If λ is larger than
(θh−θl)2
9 ,t h eﬁrm acquires information
neither with information sharing nor without it, and then V (0;1) = V (0;0).
156E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we extend our analysis in three directions. First, we allow for more than two
ﬁrms. Second, we analyze the eﬀects of competition in prices (Bertrand competition) instead of
outputs. Finally, we discuss the eﬀects of introducing correlation between the ﬁrms’ costs.
6.1 Oligopoly
Our model assumes that there is competition between only two ﬁrms. This is without loss of
generality, since an oligopoly model yields qualitatively identical results.
In a model with N ﬁrms and goods, with N ≥ 2, the representative consumer’s gross surplus
from consuming bundle (x1,..,x N)i s :





















As before, the inverse demand function for good i is linear: Pi(xi,x −i)=α−xi−β
P
j6=i xj,w h e r e
x−i ≡ (x1,..,x i−1,x i+1,..,x N). Firm i’s proﬁt of producing quantity xi is simply πi(xi,x −i;θi)=
[Pi(xi,x −i) − θi]xi for i =1 ,..,N. For any combination of messages m1,..,m N, ﬁrm i with signal










for i,j =1 ,..,N with j 6= i. Solving the system of equations (11) for i =1 ,..,N gives the following




[2 + (N − 1)β](2 − β)
µ










where E{θi|mi} = Esi{E(θi|si)|mi} and m−i ≡ (m1,..,m i−1,m i+1,..,m N). As before, infor-
mation concealment creates a distortion, as captured by the last term of (12). This distortion
dampens the sensitivity of the equilibrium outputs to the precision of information, which gives
supermodular expected proﬁts, and equilibrium strategies as in section 4 (see Appendix B).
16The consumption of the bundle (x1,..,x N) gives the representative consumer a net surplus of:






















As before, the ﬁrst term captures the quantity adjustment eﬀect, and the second term is related
to the preference for variety eﬀect. This gives essentially the same trade-oﬀ for consumers as
we described in the duopoly model. In Appendix B we show formally that the same qualitative
r e s u l t se m e r g ew i t hm o r et h a nt w oﬁrms.
6.2 Bertrand Competition
We brieﬂy consider the model where ﬁrms choose prices, pi ≥ 0f o ri =1 ,2 (Bertrand com-
petition), instead of output levels. The system of inverse demand functions gives the following





(1 − β)α + βpj − pi
¶
(14)
Firm i maximizes its proﬁt πi(pi,p j;θi) ≡ (pi − θi)Di(pi,p j).
6.2.1 Equilibrium Choices Each ﬁrm chooses its price on the basis of its own informa-
tion, si, and the information received from its competitor, mj ∈ {sj,∅}. We adopt the same
notation for conditional and unconditional expectations as before without making explicit the
dependence of si on δi.
For any combination of messages mi and mj, ﬁrm i with signal si maximizes its expected





(1 − β)α + E{θi|si} + βE{pj(sj)|mj}
¶
(15)
for i,j =1 ,2w i t hi 6= j. Solving the system of equations (15) for i =1 ,2 gives the following












17where E{θi|mi} = Esi{E(θi|si)|mi}. In equilibrium, ﬁrm i’s output level and proﬁtr e l a t ea s




i(si;mi,m j) − E{θi|si}




i(si;mi,m j) − E{θi|si}]
2
1 − β2 , (18)
respectively. Hence, the expected proﬁto fﬁrm i is:
Πb











These equilibrium proﬁts determine the ﬁrm’s incentive to acquire and share information. In
particular, we can show the following property (see Appendix B).
Lemma 2 The expected proﬁt Πb
i(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) is submodular in (δi,ρ i).
In other words, for ρi >ρ 0
i, the diﬀerence Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j)−Πi(δi,δ j;ρ0
i,ρ j) is weakly decreasing
in δi for all δj and ρj. This implies that information-sharing ﬁrms have a smaller incentive to
acquire information than concealing ﬁrms. Notice that this is the reverse result of Lemma 1.
As it turns out, this property reverses the indirect eﬀect of information sharing on the expected
consumer surplus.
6.2.2 Consumer Surplus The qualitative properties of the expected consumer surplus
in equilibrium are identical to those in Proposition 4 (see Appendix B). This gives the following
overall eﬀect of information sharing on the expected consumer surplus. For a given precision of
the ﬁrms’ signals, information sharing decreases the expected consumer surplus. This is a direct
eﬀect of information sharing. Moreover, information sharing reduces the ﬁrms’ investments in
acquiring information (Lemma 2), which reduces the expected surplus even further. In other
words, the indirect eﬀect reinforces the direct eﬀect of information sharing on the surplus when
ﬁrms compete in prices.
6.3 Correlated Costs
We have analyzed an independent private value framework. In this framework, information
acquisition creates an indirect eﬀect of information sharing on the consumer surplus. This gives a
18trade-oﬀ between a negative direct eﬀect and positive indirect eﬀect. Now we brieﬂy discuss the
eﬀects of introducing cost correlation.
Analyzing a model of imperfect positive correlation is complex, for the reasons mentioned
below. However, it is tractable and illuminating to analyze a setting in which ﬁrms have perfectly
correlated costs. In such a situation, information sharing also yields a trade-oﬀ between a direct
and indirect eﬀect on the consumer surplus. However, as Figure 4 illustrates, the directions of














Figure 4: Perfect positive correlation
Vives (1984) shows that the direct eﬀect of information sharing on consumer surplus is positive
(i.e., V (δ;1)>V(δ;0) as Figure 4 illustrates for δ = δ∗(1)). The paper shows that, with perfect
correlation, the dispersion of the industry output is larger when both ﬁrms adjusts their output
levels to a common cost shock (similarly to a common demand shock). Information sharing also
creates an indirect eﬀect, as in the model with independent costs. Vives (1984) also shows that,
similarly to present model, the more accurate is the ﬁrms’ information, the larger is the consumer
surplus (i.e., V (δ;1) and V (δ;0) are increasing in δ). Previously, information sharing gives the
ﬁrms a greater incentive to acquire information, since the output adjustments of the competitor
increases a ﬁrm’s own output dispersion. However, the more correlated are the ﬁrms’ costs, the
less important is this eﬀect. In addition, cost correlation creates a free-riding problem, since ﬁrms
may use the information of their competitors to learn about their own cost. Jansen (2008) shows
that with perfectly correlated costs the free-rider eﬀect dominates, and sharing information about
a common cost parameter leads to lower information acquisition investments (δ∗(1) <δ ∗(0) as in
Figure 4). Therefore, information sharing has a negative indirect eﬀect on the consumer surplus.11
11In fact, it can be shown that in the model corresponding to the binary example, the indirect eﬀect can dominate
the direct eﬀect of information sharing, as Figure 4 illustrates.
19In other words, the introduction of perfect cost correlation reverses the direction of both the
direct and indirect eﬀects compared with independent private value setting. This make the task
of analyzing an imperfect correlation framework very diﬃcult, since it is likely that the signs of
the direct and indirect eﬀect are going to depend not only on the degree of cost correlation but
also on the information structure that we use to set up the model.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that the incentives of acquiring information are larger when ﬁrms in a Cournot
oligopoly are allowed to share information. A higher information acquisition investment increases
the consumer surplus. These observations have important implications for an antitrust author-
ity’s choice between allowing and disallowing information sharing. Whereas conventional wisdom
predicts that information sharing reduces consumer surplus, our observations predict a surplus
increase from information sharing. Overall, the trade-oﬀ between the positive and negative eﬀects
of information sharing can make the consumer surplus larger when ﬁrms are allowed to share
information.
In the paper we used the expected consumer surplus as welfare measure. This enables us to
distinguish the eﬀects on ﬁrms from the eﬀects on consumers. A more general welfare measure
would be a weighed sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus (i.e., industry proﬁts). The
adoption of such a general welfare function would not change the main conclusion of the paper,
since information sharing gives a positive indirect eﬀect on the producer surplus too. Information
sharing gives higher information acquisition investments than information concealment (Propo-
sition 2(ii)). The higher investment under information sharing increases the industry proﬁtg a i n
from information sharing (Proposition 1(ii)). In other words, the indirect eﬀects of information
sharing on consumers and producers are aligned, and favor information sharing.
Finally, we want to stress that we have undertaken the analysis using general information
structures and new information orderings basedo nd i s p e r s i o nm e a s u r e s . T h i sm e t h o d o l o g i c a l
approach allows us to show that our results and the results of previous literature crucially depend
on the convexity of consumers’ and ﬁrms’ objective functions over output, as well as on the eﬀect
of information on the dispersion of equilibrium output.
20A Appendix
We make repeated use of the following result.
Lemma 3 If δ ranks signals according to Integral Precision, then the variance of Ei[θ|Sδ
i ] is in-
creasing in δ.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
T h ev a r i a n c eo fEi[θ|Sδ
i ]i se q u a lt o :V a r ( Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]) = E{(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ] −θi)2}. Given that (Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]−
θi)2 is a convex function of Ei[θ|Sδ
i ], the result is a direct implication of the deﬁnitions of the
convex order and integral precision.
Notice that: Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]) = E{(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ] − θi)2} = E{Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]2} − θi
2
. Then, by Lemma 3,
E{Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]2} is increasing in δ.
For the proofs of Lemma 1, and Propositions 1-3 it is convenient to rewrite the expected proﬁt
(6). First, by using the deﬁnition of x∗












































































In this last simpliﬁcation, we use the property that Esi
©
E [θi|si] − θi
ª
= 0. Then, any constant
multiplied by Esi
©
E [θi|si] − θi
ª




































































21As before, in the last two simpliﬁcations, we use the property that Esj
©
E [θj|sj] − θj
ª
=0f o r



















4(4 − β2)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ












4(4 − β2)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ

















i ]) − c(δi). (22)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :



































(i) Lemma 3 implies that (23) is increasing in δi. Further, the second term of (22) is independent
of δi, while the third term is increasing in δi. Hence, Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j)+c(δi)i si n c r e a s i n gi nδi.
(ii) T h es e c o n dt e r mo f( 2 2 )i s( w e a k l y )i n c r e a s i n gi nδj b yL e m m a3 .T h er e m a i n i n gt e r m sa r e
independent of δj (see (23) for the ﬁrst term). Hence, Πi is weakly increasing in δj.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
For any ρi,ρ 0
i ∈ [0,1], expression (22) gives:
Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) − Πi(δi,δ j;ρ0
i,ρ j)=( ρi − ρ0
i)
β2(8 − β2)
4(4 − β2)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]).
For ρi >ρ 0
i,t h i se x p r e s s i o ni si n c r e a s i n gi nδi by Lemma 3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
















As ∂Πi/∂ρj is independent of δi,w eh a v e
∂2Πi(δi,δj;ρi,ρj)
∂δi∂ρj = 0 which concludes the proof.
(ii) The result follows from Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shanon (1994) and Lemma 1.
22P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :





4(4 − β2)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ










P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :



























































































































































































































































To prove that the expected surplus is increasing in δi,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that all terms of















































Notice that only the last term depends on δi (i.e., Esi{E [θi|si]
2}), and is increasing in δi.T h i s









is increasing in δi.

















































Again, only the last term depends on δi (i.e., Esi{E [θi|si]
2}), and is increasing in δi.T h i si m m e d i -








is decreasing in δi. Subtracting
the latter component from the former component immediately implies that the ﬁrst term of V is
increasing in δi. It is straightforward to show that the second term is also increasing in δi,b y
24using the decompositions (25) and (26) in combination with the observation that the ﬁrst term
of V is increasing in δi. This proves that ∂V/∂δi > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
We ﬁrst compare the information acquisition incentives under information sharing (ρ1 =1 )a n d













1(∅;∅,θ 2)2 − λδ1.
When ﬁrm 1 shares information, then its marginal proﬁt from information acquisition is:
Π1(1;1) − Π1(0;1) = Eθ1
©
x∗





































When ﬁrm 1 conceals information, then its marginal proﬁt from information acquisition is:
Π1(1;0) − Π1(0;0) = Eθ1
©
x∗









































9 , then an information-sharing ﬁrm acquires information whereas an
information-concealing ﬁrm acquires no information, i.e., δ∗
1(1) = 1 > 0=δ∗
1(0). Therefore, in


















2 = V (δ∗
1(0);0).
25B Supplementary Appendix
Here we derive the results for the extensions of the model. First, we extend the results to
an oligopoly with N risk-neutral ﬁrms that compete in quantities of diﬀerentiated goods (with
N ≥ 2). Second, we analyze competition in prices.
B.1 Cournot Oligopoly
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⎣4(2 − β)α +4 β
X
j6=i
θj − (N − 1)β2θi −
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(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]










In the last simpliﬁcation, we use that Esi
©
E [θi|si] − θi
ª
= 0. Then, any constant multiplied by
Esi
©
E [θi|si] − θi
ª






































2(2 − β)α − 2[2 + (N − 2)β]E{θi|si}
+2β
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=0f o ra n yh =1 ,..,N.




















(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]















(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]










[2 + (N − 1)β]2(2 − β)2Var(Ej[θ|Sδ
j])
+ρi
(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]
4[2 + (N − 1)β]2(2 − β)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]) − c(δi)












(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]
4[2 + (N − 1)β]2(2 − β)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]) − c(δi) (33)
Proof of Proposition 1 for oligopoly:





















































is increasing in δi and independent of δj.
27(i) The ﬁrst and third terms of (33) are increasing in δi, while the second term is independent of
δi.H e n c e ,Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j)+c(δi)i si n c r e a s i n gi nδi.
(ii) T h es e c o n dt e r mo f( 3 3 )i s( w e a k l y )i n c r e a s i n gi nδj b yL e m m a3 .T h er e m a i n i n gt e r m sa r e
independent of δj. Hence, Πi is weakly increasing in δj.
Proof of Lemma 1 for oligopoly:
For any ρi,ρ 0
i ∈ [0,1], expression (33) gives:
Πi(δi,δ −i;ρi,ρ −i)−Πi(δi,δ −i;ρ0
i,ρ −i)=( ρi−ρ0
i)
(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]
4[2 + (N − 1)β]2(2 − β)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ]).
For ρi >ρ 0
i,t h i se x p r e s s i o ni si n c r e a s i n gi nδi by Lemma 3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 (i) for oligopoly:
(i) We want to show that ∂2Πi(δi,δ −i;ρi,ρ −i)/(∂δi∂ρj) = 0 for any j 6= i. It follows from (33)
















As ∂Πi/∂ρj is independent of δi,t h i sg i v e s∂2Πi(δi,δ −i;ρi,ρ −i)/(∂δi∂ρj) = 0 for any j 6= i.
Proof of Proposition 3 for oligopoly:




(N − 1)β2 [4(2 − β)+( N − 1)β(4 − β)]
4[2 + (N − 1)β]2(2 − β)2 Var(Ei[θ|Sδ










for any k 6= i.
After substitution of the equilibrium output levels in the expected consumer surplus (13), we
obtain the following (by slightly abusing notation):




















































28Proof of Proposition 4 for oligopoly:




































































































































































































































































(N − 1)β[4 + (N − 1)β]
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(N − 1)β [2 + (N − 2)β]






























































































































(N − 1)β[4 + (N − 1)β]




− (1 − β)
(N − 1)β [2 + (N − 2)β]





















[4 + (N − 1)β] − (1 − β)[4+(N − 2)β]
#
=
−(N − 1)β2 £
1+1
4(N − 1)β2¤





To prove that the expected surplus is increasing in δi,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that all terms

































































Notice that only the last term depends on δi (i.e., Esi{E [θi|si]
2}), and is increasing in δi.T h i s












ing in δi. Similarly, it is easy to show that the second and third terms of V are increasing in
δi. It is straightforward to show that the remaining terms are also increasing in δi,b yu s i n gt h e
decompositions (36), (37) and (38) in combination with the observation that the ﬁrst three terms
of V are increasing in δi. This proves that ∂V/∂δi > 0.
31B.2 Bertrand Competition
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. For any ρi,ρ 0
i ∈ {0,1},w eh a v e :
Πb
i(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) − Πb
i(δi,δ j;ρ0










i (si,m i,m j) ≡ p∗
i(si;mi,m j) − E{θi|si} is the equilibrium price-cost margin. By using















































































= 0. Then, any




will be also equal to 0. Therefore,
Πi(δi,δ j;ρi,ρ j) − Πi(δi,δ j;ρ0
i,ρ j)=−(ρi − ρ0
i)
β2(8 − 3β2)









= −(ρi − ρ0
i)
β2(8 − β2)
4(4 − β2)2(1 − β2)
Var(Ei[θ|Sδ
i ])
For ρi >ρ 0
i, this expression is decreasing in δi by Lemma 3 (see Appendix A).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4w i t hB e r t r a n dc o m p e t i t i o n :
The proof is analogous to the original proof (with Cournot competition). Diﬀerentiating the
expected surplus V with respect to ρi gives (24) for i,j =1 ,2a n di 6= j.T h e ﬁrst line of this






























































β(8 − 2β − 3β2)

























































































β(8 − 2β − 3β2)
8(2 − β)(4 − β2)(1 − β2)2 − (1 − β)
β(2 − β2)








8(4 − β2)2(1 − β2)2
µ













To prove that the expected surplus is increasing in δi,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that all terms of
V are increasing in δi. First, we show the ﬁrst term of V is increasing in δi by rewriting its ﬁrst











































(1 − β)E{θi|si} +( 1− β)
2 E{θi|si}2
¸¾
Notice that only the last term depends on δi (i.e., Esi{E [θi|si]
2}), and is increasing in δi.T h i s









is increasing in δi.B y















































(2 + β)(1 − β)α + βE{θj|mj}
¶
− (2 − β2)E{θi|si}2
¸¾
Again, only the last term depends on δi (i.e., Esi{E [θi|si]
2}), and this makes the second component
of the ﬁrst term increasing in δi. We can obtain similar results for the second term of V .
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